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Abstract
Central bank independence and transparency have become best practice in monetary pol-
icy. This paper cautions that transparency about economic information may not be bene-
ficial in the absence of central bank independence. The reason is that it reduces monetary
uncertainty, which could make the government less inhibited to interfere with monetary
policy. In fact, a central bank could use monetary mystique to obtain greater insulation
from political pressures, even if the government faces no direct cost of overriding. As a
result, economic secrecy could be beneficial and provide the central bank greater political
independence.
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1 Introduction
Central bank independence and transparency have become best practice in monetary policy.
But only 20 years ago, the most successful central banks, including the US Federal Reserve
and the German Bundesbank, tended to be notorious for their secrecy. This paper shows that
opacity may be desirable when a central bank could be subject to political interference. The
reason is that greater monetary uncertainty makes the government more reluctant to intervene
in monetary policy. In particular, opacity about the economic shocks to which the central
bank responds makes it more difficult to assess the central bank’s intentions from its monetary
policy actions. This gives the central bank greater leeway to set monetary policy without
government interference. As a result, a central bank could use monetary mystique to insulate
itself from political pressures.
This paper helps to explain how central banks managed to gain independence through se-
crecy before the advent of the new paradigm of central bank independence-cum-transparency.
For instance, the ‘monetary veil’ introduced by Chairman Paul Volcker in October 1979 helped
to keep US Congress at bay while the Federal Reserve pursued its painful disinflation in the
early 1980s. Furthermore, this paper cautions that in the absence of central bank indepen-
dence, economic transparency may be detrimental as it could lead to greater political interfer-
ence. Although central bank independence is prevalent in advanced economies, it is much less
common in developing countries. In fact, in the survey of 94 central banks by Fry, Julius, Ma-
hadeva, Roger and Sterne (2000, Table 4.4), 93% of central banks in industrialized countries
report they enjoy independence without significant qualifications, whereas this holds for only
57% of central banks in developing countries. For those central banks that lack independence,
economic secrecy could be an effective way to stave off unwanted political meddling with
monetary policy.
This argument is formally developed using a stylized monetary policy game in the spirit
of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). The government has a motive
to stimulate output beyond the natural rate, whereas monetary policy is set by a conservative
central banker (Rogoff 1985). The government can override the central bank’s policy decision
but only at a cost (Lohmann 1992). Uncertainty about the central bank’s true intentions and the
economic situation complicate the government’s decision whether or not to interfere. There
is rational updating of beliefs (Cukierman and Meltzer 1986, Backus and Driffill 1985, Barro
1986) and the modeling of transparency builds on Faust and Svensson (2001) and Geraats
(2005).
Transparency of monetary policy could be defined as the extent to which monetary authori-
ties disclose information that is relevant for the policymaking process; so, perfect transparency
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amounts to symmetric information. There is a growing literature on central bank transparency
that covers many aspects.1 This paper considers the effects of transparency about the central
bank’s preferences and about the economic information to which the central bank responds,
in an institutional framework in which the central bank is subject to political interference.
The effect of preference transparency on government interference has been considered by
Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2002), who extend the Lohmann (1992) model by introducing un-
certainty about the central bank’s preferences. They find that greater preference transparency
reduces the region of independence for the central bank. This result relies on the assumption
that the central bank directly sets inflation and that the government has the same economic in-
formation as the central bank. However, in practice, inflation can only be influenced indirectly
through a monetary policy instrument, such as the money supply. In addition, the monetary
policy action also reflects economic disturbances, such as money market shocks, about which
the government may not have the same information as the central bank. The contribution of
the present paper is to incorporate these two realistic assumptions. The result is that the gov-
ernment can no longer perfectly infer the central bank’s intentions and faces uncertainty about
overriding. In fact, it is shown that economic opacity gives the central bank greater freedom
from political interference, even if the government faces no direct cost of overriding. Greater
economic transparency reduces the region of independence, whereas greater preference trans-
parency actually increases it. So in contrast to Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2002), this paper
shows that in the presence of political pressures, greater preference uncertainty is detrimental
but mystique about monetary disturbances is beneficial.
There are many other papers on preference and economic transparency, but none explicitly
analyze government interference with monetary policy in the form of overriding. In general,
an important benefit of transparency is that it reduces uncertainty. But, greater transparency
could also be detrimental. For instance, it could cause financial markets to increase their re-
liance on public information to coordinate their actions, which could lead to greater volatility
if the public information is sufficiently noisy (Morris and Shin 2002). In addition, opacity
about central bank preferences could moderate wage demands by unions (Sørensen 1991) or
give rise to beneficial reputation effects (e.g. Faust and Svensson 2001, Geraats 2005), thereby
reducing inflation. Furthermore, transparency about economic information could hamper sta-
bilization policy when the public incorporates supply shocks into inflation expectations and
negatively affects the contemporaneous inflation-output trade-off (Cukierman 2001, Gersbach
2002, Jensen 2002). The present paper provides another argument against economic trans-
parency, namely that it could make central banks prone to greater political pressures and
thereby increase average inflation.
1For a comprehensive survey of the literature, see Geraats (2002).
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The basic model is presented in sec-
tion 2 and the solution derived in section 3. Section 4 considers a few extensions to the basic
model that feature more realistic objective functions and a richer economic structure, and it
shows that the conclusions are robust. In addition, this section provides some empirical sup-
port for the theoretical prediction of this paper that central banks with lower independence
are more likely to have low transparency to ward off political interference. Section 5 sum-
marizes the results and concludes that economic opacity could be desirable when the central
bank lacks institutional independence. This helps to explain the past practice of independence-
through-secrecy. Furthermore, it suggests that countries that wish to adopt the new paradigm
of central bank independence-cum-transparency should first grant the central bank political
independence before insisting on economic transparency.
2 Model
The structure of the economy is described by the simple money market equation2
pi = m+ v (1)
and the Lucas aggregate supply equation
y = y¯ + θ (pi − pie) (2)
where pi is inflation, pie private sector expectations of inflation, m money supply growth, y
real aggregate output, y¯ the natural rate of output, and θ the extent to which surprise inflation
stimulates output (θ > 0). There is a velocity shock v that is stochastic: v ∼ N (0, σ2v), with
σ2v > 0.
The government has the objective function3
WG = −1
2
(pi − τ¯)2 + β (y − y¯) (3)
where τ¯ is the government’s inflation target and β the relative weight on output stimulation
(β > 0). The government delegates monetary policy to a central bank, without granting it
complete (instrument) independence. The central bank is conservative in the sense that it puts
greater weight on inflation stabilization than the government (Rogoff 1985). For simplicity,
2Some extensions to this economic structure are discussed in section 4 and yield the same qualitative results.
3More plausible objective functions for the government and the central bank are discussed in section 4 and
yield the same conclusions.
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assume that the central bank only cares about inflation stabilization (β = 0) and that its
objective function is
WCB = −1
2
(pi − τ)2 (4)
The central bank has an unknown, stochastic inflation target τ , where τ ∼ N (τ¯ , σ2τ )with σ2τ >
0, and τ and v independent. There could be several reasons for this preference uncertainty.
First, preferences of central bankers cannot be directly observed and are therefore subject to
uncertainty. Also, central bank preferences could change because of new appointments to the
central bank’s governing body. In addition, the central bank may have goal independence.
Even if there is an explicit inflation target, such targets often take the form of a range, leaving
significant uncertainty about the central bank’s intentions. The assumption that E [τ ] = τ¯
implies that on average, the inflation target of the central bank and the government coincide.
The central bank does not enjoy complete independence and the government can decide
to override the central bank’s policy decision m, either explicitly (e.g. through an act of
parliament) or implicitly through political pressure. Assume that the government suffers a
direct cost of overriding C > 0. This could involve loss of reputation in the form of higher
inflation expectations in the future, or electoral losses due to reduced voter confidence.
Although these assumptions no longer tend to apply to most monetary institutions today,
they do effectively describe the era in which formal (instrument) independence was not the
norm, as well as the situation that still prevails in many developing countries.
The government’s decision to override the central bank is complicated by two information
asymmetries. First, as already mentioned, the government is uncertain about the central bank’s
inflation target τ . Second, the velocity shocks v are observed by the central bank, but not by
the government.4 Instead, the government only observes a stochastic signal s such that
v = s+ η (5)
where η ∼ N (0, (1− κ) σ2v) with 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1, and s, η and τ are independently distributed.
The variable η could be interpreted as the government’s forecast error of the velocity shock.
In the special case of κ = 1 there is no asymmetric information about the velocity shock so
that v = s, whereas for κ = 0 the signal provides no clues about the velocity shock and s = 0.
The parameter κ is a measure of economic transparency, where κ = 1 amounts to perfect
transparency.
Timing in the model is as follows. Initially, the central bank’s inflation target τ is real-
ized, but only known to the central bank, and the public forms its inflation expectations pie.
Subsequently, the government gets a (noisy) signal s of the velocity shock v, whereas the
4One could allow for imperfect central bank forecasts, but the conclusions would be the same.
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central bank also observes the noise η and therefore knows the actual velocity shock v. The
central bank sets the money supply mCB, which is observed by the government. Then, the
government decides whether to override the central bank and implement its policy mG under
transparency or mO under opacity. After that, inflation pi and output y are realized.
The remaining assumption concerns the formation of expectations. The central bank, gov-
ernment and private sector all have rational expectations. The central bank has perfect infor-
mation, whereas the government and private sector face imperfect information. To be precise,
the information set available to the private sector when it forms its inflation expectations pie
equals Ω ≡ {β, θ, y¯, τ¯ , κ, σ2τ , σ2v}; the government’s information set when it makes the over-
ride decision is {mCB, s,Ω}. The solution of the model is described in the next section.
3 Solution
In the absence of political pressure, the conservative central bank would implement5
m˜ = τ − v (6)
to achieve the economic outcome
pi = τ
y = y¯ + θ (τ − pie)
However, the government would prefer6
mG = τ¯ + βθ − v (7)
to obtain a higher expected level of output (given inflation expectations) but at the cost of
higher inflation:
pi = τ¯ + βθ
y = y¯ + θ (τ¯ + βθ − pie)
The government’s desire to stimulate output beyond the natural rate (β > 0) leads to the cel-
ebrated inflationary bias of discretionary monetary policy (pi > τ¯ ) first advanced by Kydland
and Prescott (1977).
5This follows from maximization of (4) with respect to m subject to (1) and (2), and given pie.
6Maximize (3) with respect to m, subject to (1) and (2), and given pie.
6
The discrepancy between (6) and (7) suggests that the government would like to override
the central bank if τ is sufficiently different from τ¯ +βθ. However, its decision is complicated
by the presence of asymmetric information about τ and v.
It is instructive to first consider the case of complete economic transparency (κ = 1).
Then, the velocity shock v is known to the government, so it can use the central bank’s policy
decision mCB to infer information about its inflation target τ . The government abstains from
overriding mCB and implementing its preferred policy mG if7
WG (mG)− C ≤ WG (mCB)
Using the fact that in the absence of government interference mCB = m˜, it is straightforward
to show that this inequality reduces to8
1
2
(τ − τ¯ − βθ)2 ≤ C (8)
So, the government decides not to override the central bank if τ¯ + βθ − √2C ≤ τ ≤ τ¯ +
βθ +
√
2C. This region of independence is increasing in the cost of overriding C. But if the
central bank’s inflation outcome pi = τ is too far from the level preferred by the government
pi = τ¯+βθ, (8) no longer holds and the government interferes with monetary policy. Since the
central bank is worse off if the government overrides its policy decision, it adjusts its policy to
prevent this. In particular, it optimally implements the monetary policy action that makes the
government indifferent between interference and independence. So, for τ < τ¯ + βθ − √2C
the central bank sets mCB = τ¯ + βθ −
√
2C − v, and for τ > τ¯ + βθ + √2C it sets
mCB = τ¯ + βθ +
√
2C − v. As a result, the government never overrides, but the possibility
of political interference does affect the monetary policy outcome.9 In particular, it leads to
higher average inflation: E [pi] > τ¯ . Intuitively, without political pressures average inflation
would be τ¯ , but the threat of overriding brings average inflation closer to the government’s
preferred level of τ¯ + βθ. These results are all similar to Lohmann (1992).
When there is incomplete economic transparency ( 0 ≤ κ < 1), the government can no
longer infer the central bank’s inflation target τ from its policy action mCB. But there is an
additional complication: The government is unable to implement its desired policy mG =
τ¯ + βθ− v because it does not observe the velocity shock v. So, it tries to extract information
about v from the central bank’s actions mCB.
The government’s preferred policy action under opacity maximizes E [WG (mO) |mCB]
subject to (1) and (2), and given pie. All expectations operators E [.] are implicitly conditional
7This assumes that the government does not override when it is indifferent; otherwise, there is no equilibrium.
8Substitute (1), (2), (7) and (6) into (3) and rearrange.
9If there would be uncertainty about the government’s preferences, overriding could occur.
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on the public information set {s,Ω}. The first order condition implies
mO = τ¯ + βθ − E [v|mCB] (9)
This is the same as the government’s preferred policy under economic transparency, mG in
(7), except that v has been replaced by E [v|mCB].
The government abstains from overriding mCB and implementing its policy mO if
E [WG (mO) |mCB]− C ≤ E [WG (mCB) |mCB] (10)
It is shown in Appendix A.1 that this no-override condition reduces to
1
2
(τ¯ + βθ − E [v|mCB]−mCB)2 ≤ C (11)
So, the central bank enjoys independence if
τ¯ + βθ − E [v|mCB]−
√
2C ≤ mCB ≤ τ¯ + βθ − E [v|mCB] +
√
2C (12)
As a result, the region of independence equals mCB ∈ [m, m¯], where the thresholds m and
m¯ only depend on publicly available information. The government overrides the central bank
only if mCB < m or mCB > m¯. But the central bank adjusts its policy to prevent the
government from intervening. Since m < mO < m¯, it directly follows from (4) that the
central bank optimally sets
mCB =

m if m˜ ≤ m
m˜ if m < m˜ < m¯
m¯ if m˜ ≥ m¯
(13)
To compute the thresholds m and m¯ it is necessary to obtain an expression for the condi-
tional expectation E [v|mCB], which involves a signal-extraction problem. For m < mCB <
m¯, it follows from (13) that E [v|mCB] = E [v|m˜]. Note that (5) and (6) imply that v and m˜
are jointly normal because of their common dependence on η, so10
E [v|m˜] = s− (1− κ)σ
2
v
σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
(m˜+ s− τ¯)
= λs− (1− λ) (m˜− τ¯) (14)
where λ ≡ σ2τ
σ2τ+(1−κ)σ2v , so that 0 < λ ≤ 1. The magnitude of λ is increasing in the degree
of economic transparency (∂λ/∂κ > 0), reflecting the fact that the signal s becomes more
10Use the fact that when x and z have a jointly normal distribution then E [x|z] = E [x]+ Cov{x,z}Var[z] (z − E [z]).
Note that all moment operators are implicitly conditional on s.
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reliable. In the limiting case of perfect transparency (κ = 1, so s = v), λ = 1 and E [v|m˜] = v.
In the case of economic opacity (κ < 1), both the signal s and the policy decision m˜ are used
to infer information about the velocity shock v. A higher level of m˜ is partly attributed to a
lower velocity shock and therefore reduces the expectation E [v|m˜].
For mCB = m, the signal-extraction problem is a bit more complicated since (13) implies
E [v|mCB] = E [v|m˜ ≤ m]. It follows from (14), (6) and (5) that11
E [v|m˜ ≤ m] = λs+ (1− λ) τ¯ − (1− λ) E [m˜|m˜ ≤ m]
= s+ (1− λ)
√
σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
φ (z)
Φ (z)
(15)
where φ (z) and Φ (z) denote the probability density function and the cumulative distribution
function of the standard normal distribution, respectively, and z ≡ m−(τ¯−s)√
σ2τ+(1−κ)σ2v
is the normal-
ized lower threshold. The low level of m˜ ≤ m is partly attributed to high velocity shocks so
that E [v|m˜ ≤ m] ≥ s.
Similarly, for mCB = m¯ it holds that E [v|mCB] = E [v|m˜ ≥ m¯], where12
E [v|m˜ ≥ m¯] = λs+ (1− λ) τ¯ − (1− λ) E [m˜|m˜ ≥ m¯]
= s− (1− λ)
√
σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯) (16)
where z¯ ≡ m¯−(τ¯−s)√
σ2τ+(1−κ)σ2v
is the normalized upper threshold. The high level of m˜ ≤ m is partly
attributed to low velocity shocks so that E [v|m˜ ≥ m¯] ≤ s.
The conditional expectations (14), (15) and (16) show how the government extracts in-
formation about the velocity shock v from the central bank’s policy decision. For perfect
economic transparency (κ = λ = 1), the expressions reduce to E [v|mCB] = s = v, so the
no-override condition (11) amounts to (8).
Using (12), (13), (15) and (16), and substituting λ yields the following conditions for the
thresholds m and m¯:
m = τ¯ + βθ − E [v|m˜ ≤ m]−
√
2C
= τ¯ + βθ − s− (1− κ)σ
2
v√
σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
φ (z)
Φ (z)
−
√
2C (17)
m¯ = τ¯ + βθ − E [v|m˜ ≥ m¯] +
√
2C
= τ¯ + βθ − s+ (1− κ)σ
2
v√
σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯) +
√
2C (18)
11Use the fact that for a normally distributed variable x ∼ N (µ, σ2), E [x|x ≤ x] = µ−σφ (x−µσ ) /Φ (x−µσ ).
12Now use the fact that for a normally distributed variable x ∼ N (µ, σ2), E [x|x ≥ x¯] = µ +
σφ
(
x¯−µ
σ
)
/
[
1− Φ ( x¯−µσ )].
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Figure 1: The effect of economic transparency on the region of independence.
The thresholds satisfy m < τ¯ + βθ− s < m¯. Note that (17) and (18) only provide an implicit
expression for m and m¯ that depends on z and z¯, respectively. There is no analytical solution
for m and m¯, except for the special case in which there is perfect economic transparency (κ =
1, so s = v). Then, (17) and (18) reduce to m = τ¯+βθ−v−√2C and m¯ = τ¯+βθ−v+√2C,
as before. For other values of κ, m and m¯ need to be computed numerically.
Figure 1 illustrates the thresholds m and m¯ over the range κ ∈ [0, 1] for the parameter
values τ¯ = s = 0, β = θ = 1, σ2τ = σ2v = 1 and C = 1/2. This implies that with perfect
economic transparency (κ = 1), the government’s desired policy is mG = 1 and the region of
independence is [0, 2]. When there is economic opacity (0 ≤ κ < 1), Figure 1 shows that the
boundaries of the region of independence m¯ and m are not symmetric around mG. Intuitively,
the government has expansionary preferences (β > 0), so it is willing to give the central bank
more leeway to expand the money supply.13 Furthermore, Figure 1 shows that m¯ is decreasing
and m is increasing in the degree of economic transparency κ, thereby shrinking the region of
independence [m, m¯]. In fact, this result holds more generally:
13Formally, when β > 0 the government anticipates a larger surprise shock |η| at m¯ than at m:
|E [v|m˜ ≥ m¯]− s| > |E [v|m˜ ≤ m¯]− s|. So, the government tolerates greater deviations on the upside than
on the downside. But for β = 0, |E [v|m˜ ≥ m¯]− s| = |E [v|m˜ ≤ m¯]− s| and the region of independence is
symmetric around τ¯ − s.
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Proposition 1 The region of independence [m, m¯] is decreasing in the degree of economic
transparency κ.
The proof is in Appendix A.2. It shows analytically that d m¯/ dκ < 0 and dm/ dκ > 0,
so that d (m¯−m) / dκ < 0. Intuitively, when there is economic opacity, the government
does not observe the velocity shock v, so is not sure whether it is appropriate to intervene and
what level of the money supply to set. Greater economic opacity makes the government more
cautious and less likely to interfere with monetary policy. As a result, less economic trans-
parency κ increases the region of independence. Figure 1 shows that reducing transparency
(from κ = 1 to κ = 0) could more than double the size of the region of independence (from
2 to over 5). Economic opacity also increases the probability that the central bank enjoys
independence.14 This in turn reduces average inflation, because there is less need to adjust
monetary policy towards the higher inflation level τ¯ + βθ. So, greater economic transparency
increases the probability of political pressures and lead to higher inflation on average.15
The effect of a higher variance of velocity shocks σ2v is the same as a reduction in economic
transparency κ.16 However, greater uncertainty about the central bank’s inflation target σ2τ
gives rise to different effects.
Proposition 2 Under economic transparency (κ = 1), the region of independence [m, m¯] is
not affected by preference uncertainty σ2τ . Under economic opacity (0 ≤ κ < 1), the region of
independence [m, m¯] is decreasing in the amount of preference uncertainty σ2τ for βθ ≤
√
2C.
The proof is in Appendix A.2. Intuitively, when there is complete economic transparency
(κ = 1) the government can perfectly infer from the central bank’s policy decision mCB
whether or not it is appropriate to intervene. In addition, it also knows exactly what policy
to implement. As a result, the amount of preference uncertainty σ2τ is immaterial. But when
there is some economic opacity (0 ≤ κ < 1), greater preference uncertainty σ2τ makes the
policy action mCB a more useful indicator of the central bank’s intentions, so the government
becomes more responsive to it and allows for less variation in mCB before intervening. The
proof shows that βθ ≤ √2C is a sufficient condition for the negative relation between pref-
erence uncertainty and the region of independence. For βθ >
√
2C, numerical simulations
14Formally, the probability of independence (i.e. no government interference) equals pI ≡ Φ(z¯) − Φ(z), so
d pI
dκ
= 1√
σ2τ+(1−κ)σ2v
(
φ (z¯) d m¯
dκ
− φ (z) dm
dκ
)
< 0.
15Interestingly, economic secrecy is not only desired by the central bank but it is also preferred by the govern-
ment at the beginning of the game, because it gives rise to lower inflation without affecting average output due
to rational private sector inflation expectations.
16To see this, note that m and m¯ only depend on κ and σ2v through (1− κ)σ2v , so a drop in κ has qualitatively
the same effect as an increase in σ2v .
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indicate that m¯ −m still tends to be decreasing in σ2τ , although it can be non-monotonic for
small σ2τ .
In the limiting case of perfect preference transparency (σ2τ → 0), no finite boundaries m
and m¯ exist.17 With perfect preference transparency (σ2τ → 0), the central bank’s inflation
target converges to the government’s target τ¯ and the central bank enjoys complete indepen-
dence for βθ ≤ √2C. Intuitively, the central bank’s policy already gives an inflation rate of
τ¯ , so if the government’s inflation bias βθ is sufficiently small, the benefit of overriding is
less than the cost C. However, for βθ >
√
2C the government’s expansionary preferences
outweigh the overriding cost, so the government always interferes and the central bank has no
independence under perfect preference transparency.
More generally, lower overriding costs reduce the independence of the central bank:
Proposition 3 The region of independence [m, m¯] is increasing in the overriding cost C.
The proof is in Appendix A.2. This result is very intuitive. When the government faces
a higher overriding cost it because more reluctant to interfere with monetary policy. So, the
region of independence increases and the probability of independence rises as well.18 As a
result, average inflation declines when overriding costs increase.
The size of the region of independence is equal to
m¯−m = (1− κ) σ
2
v√
σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
(
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯) +
φ (z)
Φ (z)
)
+ 2
√
2C
This reveals that in the presence of economic opacity (0 < κ < 1), the size of the region of
independence remains strictly positive even if the direct overriding cost C is zero. The reason
is that the government cannot observe the velocity shock, so it faces uncertainty about the
appropriate monetary policy stance. This makes the government reluctant to override the cen-
tral bank, whose policy decision is based on superior economic information. Thus, economic
opacity could serve as a substitute for direct overriding costs. In particular, a central bank
that suffers from a government with low overriding costs C could envelop itself in economic
secrecy to effectively make political interference more costly.
To summarize the (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium outcome of the model, the central bank’s
policy action is given by (6), (13), (17) and (18), and there is no overriding by the government.
The properties of the central bank’s region of independence are given by Propositions 1, 2 and
3.
17To see this, note that φ(z¯)1−Φ(z¯) has an asymptote of z¯ as m¯ → ∞, so for σ2τ → 0 the right-hand side of (18)
goes to βθ + m¯+
√
2C. This means that (18) yields no fixed point for m¯. Similarly, the right-hand side of (17)
goes to βθ +m−√2C as σ2τ → 0 so that there is no fixed point for m.
18Formally, d pI
dC
= 1√
σ2τ+(1−κ)σ2v
(
φ (z¯) d m¯
dC
− φ (z) dm
dC
)
> 0.
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4 Discussion
The model considered so far is based on several simplistic assumptions regarding the eco-
nomic structure and the objective functions of the central bank and the government. It is now
shown that the results in Propositions 1, 2 and 3 hold more generally. First, an extension of
the model is considered with standard objective functions that exhibit a concern about the sta-
bilization of both inflation and output. Second, a richer economic structure is discussed that
also includes supply shocks.
Suppose that the government not only aims to stimulate output beyond the natural rate but
also cares about output stabilization, so that
WG = −1
2
α (pi − τ¯)2 − 1
2
(
y − k¯y¯)2 (19)
where α denotes the concern for inflation stabilization (α > 0) and k¯y¯ is the government’s
output target (k¯ > 1). Such a quadratic objective function is consistent with microfoundations
and the assumption that the output target exceeds the natural rate (k¯ > 1) could be based
on a plausible market imperfection such as imperfect competition. In addition, suppose that
the central bank is no longer an ‘inflation nutter’ that puts no weight on output stabilization.
Instead, the central bank cares as much about output stabilization as the government but it is
‘responsible’ in the sense that it does not attempt to stimulate output beyond the natural rate
(Blinder 1997):
WCB = −1
2
α (pi − τ)2 − 1
2
(y − y¯)2 (20)
Appendix A.3 derives the results for this model extension. It shows that the algebraic expres-
sions become messier but Propositions 1 and 3 continue to hold. Proposition 2 also holds
when the sufficient condition βθ ≤ √2C is replaced by θ√
α+θ2
(
k¯ − 1) y¯ ≤ √2C, which
again means that the overriding cost C dominates the government’s expansionary preferences
(k¯ > 1).
Now consider a less simplistic economic structure. The simple money market equation (1)
could be replaced by the quantity equation
pi = m+ v − y
It is straightforward to check that this only makes the expressions for the money supply m
and the corresponding thresholds more complicated because of an additional intercept term,
without affecting any of the qualitative economic results.
A more realistic economic structure would feature aggregate supply shocks ε, replacing
(2) by
y = y¯ + θ (pi − pie) + ε (21)
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The introduction of supply shocks ε has no effect on the conclusions of the model when
there is symmetric information about the supply shocks. When the central bank has private
information about the supply shocks ε, the results in the basic model of section 2 are not
affected since ε does not affect the money supply m. In the extended model with the quadratic
objectives (19) and (20), opacity about the supply shocks ε does influence the outcomes, but
in a similar way to opacity about the velocity shocks v. In particular, when the degree of
transparency κ is the same for the economic shocks ε and v, the results can simply be obtained
by replacing v by vε ≡ v + θα+θ2 ε in all the algebraic expressions. So, Propositions 1, 2 and 3
continue to hold.
In addition, instead of the neo-monetarist framework in this paper, there could be an inter-
est rate transmission mechanism. Then the monetary policy instrument is the interest rate and
(1) would be replaced by an aggregate demand relation with demand shock d, while (21) could
be interpreted as an expectations-augmented Phillips curve. In that case, aggregate demand
shocks d and aggregate supply shocks ε matter for economic transparency, but otherwise the
conclusions are similar.
It is useful to compare the results of this paper with Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2002),
who assume (19), (20) and (21). In contrast to Proposition 2, Eijffinger and Hoeberichts
(2002) find that preference transparency decreases the expected region of independence. They
model greater preference transparency as a reduction in uncertainty about the central bank’s
preference parameter for inflation stabilization α, which essentially makes the central bank
more conservative. But this critically depends on how relative preference uncertainty is mod-
elled.19 Less uncertainty about the parameter for output stabilization would make the central
bank less conservative and reverse the results. Using an ‘unbiased’ specification that does
not distort average conservativeness, greater preference transparency would have no effect
on average economic outcomes in the Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2002) model. Since they
(implicitly) assume economic transparency, this is consistent with the result in Proposition 2
that preference uncertainty does not affect the region of independence for κ = 1. So, the
contribution of the present paper is that it establishes that economic (rather than preference)
transparency reduces the region of independence for the central bank. Furthermore, it derives
the novel result that economic opacity gives the central bank greater freedom from political
pressures even if there is no direct overriding cost (C = 0).
Thus, this paper provides a theoretical argument for the observation that central banks
could adopt secrecy to obtain greater independence.20 An interesting example is the way the
19This was first pointed out by Beetsma and Jensen (2003). Geraats (2004) provides further details on the
pitfalls of modeling relative preference uncertainty.
20For instance, Goodfriend (1986, p. 82) argues that “secrecy makes it more difficult for particular political
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Federal Reserve under Chairman Paul Volcker managed to implement a painful disinflation
policy during the early 1980s. The introduction of monetary targeting in October 1979 made
it more difficult for Congress to assess whether high interest rates where due to restrictive
monetary policy or market forces. The change in monetary operating procedures effectively
made the monetary policy instrument a less reliable signal of the policy stance due to imperfect
information about money market disturbances. So, Congress felt more reluctant to challenge
the monetary policy actions of the Federal Reserve. As a result, the ‘monetary veil’ provided
cover to pursue the disinflation without political interference.
The present paper suggests that central banks with lower independence benefit more from
secrecy to fend off government intervention, so they are less likely to be transparent. Thus,
it predicts a positive relation between central bank independence and transparency. To inves-
tigate this empirically, the comprehensive survey of central banks by Fry, Julius, Mahadeva,
Roger and Sterne (2000) is used. Fry et al. (2000, Table 4.6) construct an index for ‘policy
explanations’ based on twelve items covering explanations of policy decisions, forecasts and
forward looking analysis, and policy assessments and research. This measure is used as a
proxy for economic transparency.21 In addition, Fry et al. (2000, Table 4.4) provide an index
for central bank independence that captures statutory objectives of price stability, goal and
instrument independence, limits on monetary financing of budget deficits, and the length of
central bankers’ term of office. It also comprises a separate measure for instrument indepen-
dence. Data is available for 92 countries.
Table 1: Relation between central bank transparency and independence.
Correlation with transparency [p-value] Full sample Excl. fixed FX Fixed FX
Independence 0.430 [<0.001] 0.450 [<0.001] 0.261 [0.157]
Instrument independence 0.339 [0.001] 0.392 [0.002] 0.186 [0.316]
Sample size 92 61 31
Table 1 shows that there is a statistically significant positive correlation between trans-
parency and central bank independence (with p-values in brackets). Using the more specific
measure of instrument independence gives the same finding. This is consistent with the theo-
retical prediction of this paper that central banks with lower independence are likely to display
lower transparency.
However, there is an alternative, public policy argument that also generates a positive
relation between central bank independence and transparency. Institutional independence re-
quires public accountability to safeguard democratic legitimacy, and accountability requires
groups to pressure the Federal Reserve regarding current policy actions”.
21Three out of twelve items do not pertain to economic transparency and have a weight of 15.5%. Recon-
structing the index to get a more accurate measure of economic transparency yields similar conclusions.
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transparency. Fortunately, it is possible to distinguish between this public policy motive and
the economic explanation advanced in this paper. The former should always apply regardless
of the monetary policy framework, whereas the latter relies on the presence of discretionary
monetary policy. In particular, the economic argument does not apply to countries that commit
to a fixed exchange rate.
Table 1 shows that there is indeed a marked difference between countries with and without
a fixed exchange rate regime. The correlation between transparency and (instrument) inde-
pendence remains positive and highly significant for countries without a fixed exchange rate,
but it is much weaker for countries that have abandoned discretion over monetary policy by
the adoption of a fixed exchange rate regime.22 These findings provide some tentative empir-
ical support for the economic argument formalized in this paper that the positive relationship
between central bank independence and transparency is caused by the use of secrecy to limit
political interference.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the present paper analyzes the optimal degree of
transparency for a given institutional framework. The override mechanism captures the lack
of complete instrument independence that used to be prevalent and still applies to many de-
veloping countries. The seminal contributions by Walsh (1995) and Svensson (1997) suggest
better institutional frameworks through contracting and inflation targeting. An interesting
topic is the joint optimality of disclosure policy and institutional settings, but this is left for
future research.
5 Conclusion
The new paradigm in monetary policy of central bank independence and transparency has
rapidly gained ground. This paper cautions that transparency may not be beneficial without
central bank independence. In particular, uncertainty about the economic information to which
the central bank responds makes politicians more cautious about intervening in monetary pol-
icy because it is harder to interpret the central bank’s actions. As a result, economic secrecy
effectively gives the central bank greater political independence.
This paper has formalized this argument using a monetary policy game in which a con-
servative or responsible central bank without complete independence sets monetary policy.
The government, which aims to stimulate output beyond the natural rate, can override the
monetary policy decision, but this involves a direct override cost. The government’s decision
22Rank correlations of transparency with independence and instrument independence give similar results:
0.504 [<0.001] and 0.373 [<0.001] for the full sample; 0.483 [<0.001] and 0.381 [0.003] excluding fixed ex-
change rates; and 0.360 [0.047] and 0.323 [0.073] for countries with a fixed exchange rate regime.
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to override the central bank is complicated by the presence of uncertainty about the central
bank’s intentions and imperfect information about the economic situation. It is shown that the
region of independence enjoyed by the central bank is declining in the degree of economic
transparency and in the amount of preference uncertainty. Intuitively, economic transparency
reduces the government’s uncertainty about whether to override and how to set the policy in-
strument, so it makes the government less inhibited to interfere with monetary policy. Greater
preference uncertainty makes the central bank’s policy action a more useful signal of its inten-
tions, so the government becomes more sensitive to it and leaves the central bank less leeway
before overriding. The region of independence is increasing in the overriding cost for the gov-
ernment. More interestingly, this paper obtains the new result that even in the absence of a
direct overriding cost, the size of the region of independence is strictly positive when there is
economic opacity. Intuitively, if the government feels uninhibited to interfere with monetary
policy, the central bank could effectively make overriding costly by depriving the government
of important economic information. Thus, the central bank could insulate itself from political
pressures by enveloping itself in economic secrecy.
The model generates the theoretical prediction that central banks with lower independence
are more likely to display less transparency. Empirically, there is indeed a strong positive
correlation between central bank independence and transparency. But this could also be for
public policy reasons as central bank independence requires accountability and therefore trans-
parency. Interestingly, the positive relation between independence and transparency does not
hold for countries that maintain a fixed exchange rate regime. This seems at odds with the pub-
lic policy argument, but it supports the economic explanation advanced in this paper, which
relies on discretionary monetary policy.
The main conclusion of the paper is that economic opacity could be beneficial if the central
bank lacks instrument independence because it makes it more difficult for the government
to interfere with monetary policy. This helps to explain the past practice of independence-
through-secrecy. The paper also has policy implications for countries that wish to adopt the
new paradigm of central bank independence-cum-transparency. It is important to ensure that
the central bank has political independence before insisting on economic transparency, since
monetary mystique is an effective way to prevent political pressures.
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A Appendix
This appendix derives the no-override condition (11) in the basic model of section A.1 with
objective functions (3) and (4). The proofs to Propositions 1, 2 and 3 are in section A.2. The
derivation of the results for the extended model with objective functions (19) and (20) is in
section A.3.
A.1 No-override condition
The condition for no government interference is given by (10):
E [WG (mO) |mCB]− C ≤ E [WG (mCB) |mCB]
This is equivalent to E [D|mCB] ≤ C, where D ≡ WG (mO)−WG (mCB). Substitute (2) and
(1) into (3) to get
WG = −1
2
(m+ v − τ¯)2 + βθ (m+ v − pie)
So,
D = −1
2
(
(mO)
2 − (mCB)2
)
+ (mO −mCB) (τ¯ + βθ)− (mO −mCB) v
Substituting (9) and rearranging,
D =
1
2
(τ¯ + βθ −mCB)2 − 1
2
(E [v|mCB])2 − (τ¯ + βθ − E [v|mCB]−mCB) v
Taking expectations and simplifying gives
E [D|mCB] = 1
2
(τ¯ + βθ −mCB)2 + 1
2
(E [v|mCB])2 − (τ¯ + βθ −mCB) E [v|mCB]
=
1
2
(τ¯ + βθ − E [v|mCB]−mCB)2
Hence, (10) if and only if (11).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1, 2 and 3
To facilitate the derivation of results for the extended model of section 4, this section proves
Propositions 1, 2 and 3 for a general model in which the no-override condition is
1
2
b (B − E [v|mCB]−mCB)2 ≤ C (22)
So, the thresholds of the region of independence are determined by
m¯ = B − E [v|m˜ ≥ m¯] +
√
2C/b (23)
m = B − E [v|m˜ ≤ m]−
√
2C/b (24)
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The central bank’s money supply without political pressures is assumed to satisfy m˜|s ∼
N (A− s, a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v). The corresponding expected velocity shock equals
E [v|m˜ ≥ m¯] = s− (1− κ)σ
2
v√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯) (25)
E [v|m˜ ≤ m] = s+ (1− κ) σ
2
v√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
φ (z)
Φ (z)
(26)
and the normalized thresholds are
z¯ ≡ m¯− (A− s)√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
and z ≡ m− (A− s)√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
(27)
The coefficients are assumed to satisfy B > A, b > 0 and a > 0. For the basic model of
section 2, B = τ¯ + βθ, A = τ¯ and b = a = 1.
The proofs of Propositions 1, 2 and 3 make use of the following two results:
Lemma 1 The function φ(z)
1−Φ(z) is convex and has the property that 0 < dd z
φ(z)
1−Φ(z) < 1 for
z ∈ R.
Proof. See Sampford (1953).
Note that φ(z)
1−Φ(z) is increasing, with a horizontal asymptote of 0 as z → −∞ and an asymptote
of z as z →∞.
Lemma 2 The function φ(z)
Φ(z)
is convex and has the property that −1 < d
d z
φ(z)
Φ(z)
< 0 for z ∈ R.
Proof. Using the fact that φ (z) = φ (−z) and Φ (z) = 1 − Φ (−z), φ(z)
Φ(z)
= φ(−z)
1−Φ(−z) . So, the
result is a corollary of Lemma 1.
Note that φ(z)
Φ(z)
is decreasing, with an asymptote of−z as z → −∞ and a horizontal asymptote
of 0 as z →∞.
Proposition 3 is derived first since it generates a result that is used to prove Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Differentiate (23) with respect to C and use (27) to get
d m¯
dC
=
(1− κ) σ2v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
d
d z¯
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯)
d m¯
dC
+
1√
2bC
Rearranging gives
d m¯
dC
=
1
1− (1−κ)σ2v
a2σ2τ+(1−κ)σ2v
d
d z¯
φ(z¯)
1−Φ(z¯)
1√
2bC
> 0 (28)
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using Lemma 1.
Similarly, differentiate (24) with respect to C and use (27) to get
dm
dC
= − (1− κ) σ
2
v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
d
d z
φ (z)
Φ (z)
dm
dC
− 1√
2bC
Rearranging gives
dm
dC
= − 1
1 + (1−κ)σ
2
v
a2σ2τ+(1−κ)σ2v
d
d z
φ(z)
Φ(z)
1√
2bC
< 0 (29)
using Lemma 2.
As a result, d(m¯−m)
dC
> 0 so that the region of independence [m, m¯] is increasing in the
override cost C.
Proof of Proposition 1:
The proof proceeds in two parts. First it is shown that d m¯
dκ
< 0, and then that dm
dκ
> 0.
(I) Differentiate (23) with respect to κ using (25) and (27) to get
d m¯
dκ
=
−σ2v (a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v)− 12 (1− κ)σ2v(√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
)3 φ (z¯)1− Φ (z¯)
+
(1− κ)σ2v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
(
d
d z¯
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯)
)(
d m¯
dκ
+
1
2
σ2v
m¯− (A− s)
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
)
This already gives dm¯
dκ
∣∣
κ=1
= − bσ2v
aστ
φ(z¯)
1−Φ(z¯) < 0. Rearranging yields(
1− (1− κ)σ
2
v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
d
d z¯
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯)
)
d m¯
dκ
= −1
2
σ2v (2a
2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v)(√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
)3 φ (z¯)1− Φ (z¯)
+
1
2
σ2v
(1− κ)σ2v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
(
d
d z¯
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯)
)
m¯− (A− s)
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
≡ R¯
Note that the left-hand-side factor is strictly positive by Lemma 1 so that sgn (d m¯/ dκ) =
sgn R¯. The first term on the right-hand side is strictly negative, whereas the second term is
positive using Lemma 1 and the fact that (23) and (25) imply m¯ > B−s > A−s. Substituting
(23) and (25) and rearranging gives
R¯ = −1
2
σ2v
(
2a2σ2τ +
(
1− (1−κ)σ2v
a2σ2τ+(1−κ)σ2v
d
d z¯
φ(z¯)
1−Φ(z¯)
)
(1− κ)σ2v
)
(√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
)3 φ (z¯)1− Φ (z¯)
+
1
2
σ2v
(1− κ)σ2v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
(
d
d z¯
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯)
)
B − A+√2C/b
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
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Using Lemma 1 and B > A, the first term is strictly negative, whereas the second term is
positive. To determine sgn R¯ it is useful to consider a more tractable upper bound on R¯ that
can be obtained using Lemma 1:
R¯ < − σ
2
va
2σ2τ(√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
)3 φ (z¯)1− Φ (z¯) + 12σ2v (1− κ)σ2va2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
(
d
d z¯
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯)
)
B − A+√2C/b
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
< − σ
2
va
2σ2τ(√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
)3 φ (z¯)1− Φ (z¯) + 12σ2v (1− κ)σ2va2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v B − A+
√
2C/b
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
≡ Rmax (30)
It is now shown that Rmax < 0. Note that φ(z¯)1−Φ(z¯) is increasing in z¯ (by Lemma 1), and z¯
is increasing in C (using (28)), so the first term of Rmax is decreasing in C, whereas the
second term is increasing in C. Since φ(z¯)
1−Φ(z¯) has an asymptote of z¯ as z¯ → ∞, and m¯ → ∞
as C → ∞ by (23), the first term of Rmax dominates the second term as C → ∞. So,
Rmax < 0 for sufficiently large C. Since Rmax may be non-monotonic, critical point(s) at
which dRmax/ dC = 0 (if any) need to be checked to assess whether Rmax < 0 for all C.
Substituting (28), the first order condition equals
a2σ2vσ
2
τ
(a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v)2
(
d
d z¯
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯)
)
1
1− (1−κ)σ2v
a2σ2τ+(1−κ)σ2v
d
d z¯
φ(z¯)
1−Φ(z¯)
1√
2bC
=
1
2
σ2v
(1− κ)σ2v
(a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v)2
1√
2bC
Rearranging and simplifying yields
2a2σ2τ
d
d z¯
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯) = (1− κ)σ
2
v
(
1− (1− κ)σ
2
v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
d
d z¯
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯)
)
(
2a4σ4τ + 2a
2σ2τ (1− κ)σ2v + (1− κ)2 σ4v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
)
d
d z¯
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯) = (1− κ)σ
2
v
d
d z¯
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯) =
(1− κ) σ2v(
a2σ2τ
a2σ2τ+(1−κ)σ2v + 1
)
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
(31)
The left-hand side has a range of (0, 1) and it is monotonic in z¯ as φ(z)
1−Φ(z) is convex (Lemma
1), so (31) holds for exactly one z¯ for 0 ≤ κ < 1. If this implies a complex number for C,
no (real) critical point exists and Rmax < 0. Otherwise, there is one critical point Cc and it
is straightforward to check that dRmax/ dC goes from positive to negative at Cc so that it
represents a maximum. To evaluate Rmax at Cc the corresponding expression for φ(z)1−Φ(z) is
required. To this end, differentiate φ(z¯)
1−Φ(z¯) with respect to z¯ and substitute (27), (23) and (25)
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to get23
d
d z¯
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯) =
(
−z¯ + φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯)
)
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯)
=
(
− B − A+
√
2C/b√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
− (1− κ)σ
2
v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯) +
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯)
)
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯)
Substituting this into (31) and rearranging gives
a2σ2τ
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯) =
(1− κ) σ2v(
a2σ2τ
a2σ2τ+(1−κ)σ2v + 1
)
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
1− Φ (z¯)
φ (z¯)
+
B − A+√2C/b√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
Substituting this into (30) gives
Rcmax = −
σ2v√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
(1− κ)σ2v(
a2σ2τ
a2σ2τ+(1−κ)σ2v + 1
)
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
1− Φ (z¯)
φ (z¯)
−σ2v
(
1− 1
2
(1− κ)σ2v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
)
B − A+√2C/b
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
Recall that B > A, so, Rcmax < 0 at the critical point (if any). As a result, R¯ < 0 for all C.
Therefore, d m¯
dκ
< 0.
(II) Differentiate (24) with respect to κ using (26) and (27) to get
dm
dκ
= −−σ
2
v (a
2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v)− 12 (1− κ)σ2v(√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
)3 φ (z)Φ (z)
− (1− κ)σ
2
v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
(
d
d z
φ (z)
Φ (z)
)(
dm
dκ
+
1
2
σ2v
m− (A− s)
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
)
This already gives dm
dκ
∣∣∣
κ=1
= bσ
2
v
aστ
φ(z)
Φ(z)
> 0. Rearranging yields
(
1 +
(1− κ) σ2v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
d
d z
φ (z)
Φ (z)
)
dm
dκ
=
1
2
σ2v (2a
2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v)(√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
)3 φ (z)Φ (z)
− 1
2
σ2v
(1− κ)σ2v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
(
d
d z
φ (z)
Φ (z)
)
m− (A− s)
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
≡ R
Note that the left-hand-side factor is strictly positive by Lemma 2 so that sgn (dm/ dκ) =
sgnR. The first term on the right-hand side is strictly positive, whereas the second term is
23Use the fact that φ′ (z) = −zφ (z) and Φ′ (z) = φ (z).
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ambiguous. Substituting (24) and (26) and rearranging gives
R =
1
2
σ2v
(
2a2σ2τ +
(
1 + (1−κ)σ
2
v
a2σ2τ+(1−κ)σ2v
d
d z
φ(z)
Φ(z)
)
(1− κ) σ2v
)
(√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
)3 φ (z)Φ (z)
−1
2
σ2v
(1− κ) σ2v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
(
d
d z
φ (z)
Φ (z)
)
B − A−√2C/b
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
Using Lemma 2, the first term is strictly positive and the second term is also positive ifB−A >√
2C/b. So, B − A ≥ √2C/b is a sufficient condition for R > 0. To determine sgnR for
B − A < √2C/b it is useful to consider a more tractable lower bound on R that can be
obtained using Lemma 2:
R >
σ2va
2σ2τ(√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
)3 φ (z)Φ (z) − 12σ2v (1− κ)σ2va2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
(
d
d z
φ (z)
Φ (z)
)
B − A−√2C/b
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
>
σ2va
2σ2τ(√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
)3 φ (z)Φ (z) + 12σ2v (1− κ) σ2va2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v B − A−
√
2C/b
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
≡ Rmin (32)
It is now shown that Rmin > 0 for
√
2C/b > B−A. First, note that Rmin is strictly positive for
C = 0 as B > A. In addition, φ(z)
Φ(z)
is decreasing in z (by Lemma 2), and z is decreasing in C
(using (29)), so the first term of Rmin is increasing in C, whereas the second term is decreasing
in C. Since φ(z)
Φ(z)
has an asymptote of −z as z → −∞, and m → −∞ as C → ∞ by (24),
the first term of Rmin dominates the second term as C → ∞. So, Rmin > 0 for sufficiently
large C. Since Rmin may be non-monotonic, critical point(s) at which dRmin/ dC = 0 (if
any) need to be checked to assess whether Rmin > 0 for all C. Substituting (29), the first order
condition equals
− σ
2
va
2σ2τ
(a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v)2
(
d
d z
φ (z)
Φ (z)
)
1
1 + (1−κ)σ
2
v
a2σ2τ+(1−κ)σ2v
d
d z
φ(z)
Φ(z)
1√
2bC
=
1
2
σ2v
(1− κ)σ2v
(a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v)2
1√
2bC
Rearranging and simplifying yields
−2a2σ2τ d
d z
φ (z)
Φ (z)
= (1− κ)σ2v
(
1 +
(1− κ)σ2v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
d
d z
φ (z)
Φ (z)
)
−
(
2a4σ4τ + 2a
2σ2τ (1− κ)σ2v + (1− κ)2 σ4v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
)
d
d z
φ (z)
Φ (z)
= (1− κ) σ2v
d
d z
φ (z)
Φ (z)
= − (1− κ)σ
2
v(
a2σ2τ
a2σ2τ+(1−κ)σ2v + 1
)
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
(33)
23
The left-hand side has a range of (−1, 0) and it is monotonic in z as φ(z)
Φ(z)
is convex (Lemma
2), so (33) holds for exactly one z for 0 ≤ κ < 1. If this implies a complex number for
C, no (real) critical point exists and Rmin > 0. Otherwise, there is one critical point Cc and
it is straightforward to check that dRmin/ dC goes from negative to positive at Cc so that
it represents a minimum. To evaluate Rmin at Cc the corresponding expression for φ(z)Φ(z) is
required . To this end, differentiate φ(z)
Φ(z)
with respect to z and substitute (27), (24) and (26) to
get
d
d z
φ (z)
Φ (z)
= −
(
z +
φ (z)
Φ (z)
)
φ (z)
Φ (z)
= −
(
B − A−√2C/b√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
− (1− κ)σ
2
v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
φ (z)
Φ (z)
+
φ (z)
Φ (z)
)
φ (z)
Φ (z)
Substituting this into (33) and rearranging gives
a2σ2τ
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
φ (z)
Φ (z)
=
(1− κ)σ2v(
a2σ2τ
a2σ2τ+(1−κ)σ2v + 1
)
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
Φ (z)
φ (z)
− B − A−
√
2C/b√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
Substituting this into (32) gives
Rcmin =
σ2v√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
(1− κ)σ2v(
a2σ2τ
a2σ2τ+(1−κ)σ2v + 1
)
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
Φ (z)
φ (z)
−σ2v
(
1− 1
2
(1− κ)σ2v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
)
B − A−√2C/b
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
So, for
√
2C/b > B − A, Rcmin > 0 at the critical point (if any). This implies that Rmin > 0
and thereby R > 0 for B − A < √2C/b. As a result, R > 0 for all C ≥ 0. Therefore,
dm
dκ
> 0.
Finally, combining the results under (I) and (II) yields d(m¯−m)
dκ
< 0, so that the region of
independence is decreasing in the degree of economic transparency.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The proof proceeds in two parts. First it is shown that d m¯
dσ2τ
< 0, and then that dm
dσ2τ
> 0.
(I) Differentiate (23) with respect to σ2τ using (25) and (27) to get
d m¯
dσ2τ
= −1
2
a2 (1− κ)σ2v(√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
)3 φ (z¯)1− Φ (z¯)
+
(1− κ)σ2v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
(
d
d z¯
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯)
)(
d m¯
dσ2τ
− 1
2
a2
m¯− (A− s)
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
)
24
This gives dm¯
dσ2τ
∣∣∣
κ=1
= 0. Rearranging yields
(
1− (1− κ)σ
2
v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
d
d z¯
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯)
)
d m¯
dσ2τ
= −1
2
a2 (1− κ)σ2v(√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
)3 φ (z¯)1− Φ (z¯)
− 1
2
a2 (1− κ) σ2v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
(
d
d z¯
φ (z¯)
1− Φ (z¯)
)
m¯− (A− s)
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
Note that the left-hand-side factor is strictly positive by Lemma 1. In addition, the right-hand
side is (strictly) negative (for κ 6= 1) using Lemma 1 and the fact that (23) and (25) imply
m¯ > B − s > A− s. As a result, d m¯
dσ2τ
< 0 for κ 6= 1.
(II) Differentiate (24) with respect to σ2τ using (26) and (27) to get
dm
dσ2τ
=
1
2
a2 (1− κ)σ2v(√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
)3 φ (z)Φ (z)
− (1− κ)σ
2
v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
(
d
d z
φ (z)
Φ (z)
)(
dm
d σ2τ
− 1
2
a2
m− (A− s)
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
)
This gives dm
dσ2τ
∣∣∣
κ=1
= 0. Rearranging yields
(
1 +
(1− κ) σ2v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
d
d z
φ (z)
Φ (z)
)
dm
d σ2τ
=
1
2
a2 (1− κ)σ2v(√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
)3 φ (z)Φ (z)
+
1
2
a2 (1− κ)σ2v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
(
d
d z
φ (z)
Φ (z)
)
m¯− (A− s)
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
≡ R
Note that the left-hand-side factor is strictly positive by Lemma 2. So, sgn (dm/ d σ2τ ) =
sgnR. Substituting (24) and (26) and rearranging gives
R =
1
2
(
1− (1− κ)σ
2
v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
d
d z
φ (z)
Φ (z)
)
a2 (1− κ)σ2v(√
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
)3 φ (z)Φ (z)
+
1
2
a2 (1− κ)σ2v
a2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
(
d
d z
φ (z)
Φ (z)
)
B − A−√2C/b
a2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
Using Lemma 2, the first term is strictly positive and the second term is also positive ifB−A <√
2C/b. So, B − A ≤ √2C/b is a sufficient condition for R > 0 (κ 6= 1). However, for
B − A >√2C/b, R < 0 is possible. Therefore, dm
dσ2τ
> 0 for B − A ≤√2C/b and κ 6= 1.
Finally, combining the results under (I) and (II) yields that d(m¯−m)
dσ2τ
= 0 for κ = 1, so the
amount of preference uncertainty is immaterial for the region of independence with perfect
economic transparency. For 0 ≤ κ < 1, d(m¯−m)
dσ2τ
< 0 for B − A ≤ √2C/b, so the region of
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independence is decreasing in the amount of preference uncertainty when the overriding cost
is not too small. Note that for the basic model in section 2 the sufficient condition reduces to
βθ ≤ √2C.
A.3 Derivations for extended model
This appendix derives the results for the extended model of section 4 with objective functions
(19) and (20). The condition for no government interference is still equal to (10), which is
equivalent to E [D|mCB] ≤ C, where D ≡ WG (mO) −WG (mCB). Substitute (2) and (1)
into (19) to get
WG = −1
2
α (m+ v − τ¯)2 − 1
2
(
θ (m+ v − pie)− (k¯ − 1) y¯)2 (34)
So,
D = −1
2
(
α+ θ2
) (
(mO)
2 − (mCB)2
)
+ (mO −mCB)
(
ατ¯ + θ2pie + θ
(
k¯ − 1) y¯)
− (mO −mCB)
(
α + θ2
)
v (35)
The policy action desired by the government follows from maximization of E [WG|mCB] using
(34), subject to (2) and (1) and given pie:
mO =
α
α+ θ2
τ¯ +
θ2
α + θ2
pie +
θ
α + θ2
(
k¯ − 1) y¯ − E [v|mCB] (36)
Substituting (36) into (35) and rearranging,
D =
1
2
(
α+ θ2
)( α
α+ θ2
τ¯ +
θ2
α + θ2
pie +
θ
α + θ2
(
k¯ − 1) y¯ −mCB)2 − 1
2
(
α+ θ2
)
(E [v|mCB])2
− (α + θ2)( α
α + θ2
τ¯ +
θ2
α + θ2
pie +
θ
α+ θ2
(
k¯ − 1) y¯ − E [v|mCB]−mCB) v
Taking expectations and simplifying gives
E [D|mCB] = 1
2
(
α + θ2
)( α
α + θ2
τ¯ +
θ2
α+ θ2
pie +
θ
α+ θ2
(
k¯ − 1) y¯ − E [v|mCB]−mCB)2
Hence, the no-override condition equals (22) with B = α
α+θ2
τ¯ + θ
2
α+θ2
pie+ θ
α+θ2
(
k¯ − 1) y¯ and
b = α + θ2.
The central bank now maximizes (20) subject to (2) and (1) and given pie, so in the absence
of political pressure it would implement
m˜ =
α
α+ θ2
τ +
θ2
α + θ2
pie − v
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This means that the expressions for E [v|mCB] are affected. Using joint normality of m˜ and v,
E [v|m˜] = s− (1− κ)σ
2
v
α2
(α+θ2)
2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
(
m˜+ s− α
α + θ2
τ¯ − θ
2
α+ θ2
pie
)
= λ2s− (1− λ2)
(
m˜− α
α + θ2
τ¯ − θ
2
α + θ2
pie
)
(37)
where 1− λ2 ≡ (1−κ)σ2vα2
(α+θ2)2
σ2τ+(1−κ)σ2v
. Similarly,
E [v|m˜ ≥ m¯] = λ2s+ (1− λ2)
(
α
α + θ2
τ¯ +
θ2
α+ θ2
pie
)
− (1− λ2) E [m˜|m˜ ≥ m¯]
= s− (1− λ2)
√
α2(
α + θ2
)2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v φ (z¯)1− Φ (z¯)
E [v|m˜ ≤ m] = λ2s+ (1− λ2)
(
α
α + θ2
τ¯ +
θ2
α+ θ2
pie
)
− (1− λ2) E [m˜|m˜ ≤ m]
= s+ (1− λ2)
√
α2(
α+ θ2
)2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v φ (z)Φ (z)
where the normalized thresholds now equal
z¯ ≡
m¯−
(
α
α+θ2
τ¯ + θ
2
α+θ2
pie − s
)
√
α2
(α+θ2)
2σ2τ + (1− κ)σ2v
and z ≡
m−
(
α
α+θ2
τ¯ + θ
2
α+θ2
pie − s
)
√
α2
(α+θ2)
2σ2τ + (1− κ) σ2v
Hence, for a = α
α+θ2
and A = α
α+θ2
τ¯ + θ
2
α+θ2
pie the expected velocity shock satisfies (25) and
(26) and the normalized thresholds equal (27).
As a result, the extension of the model in section 4 is identical to the general model of
appendix A.2 for B = α
α+θ2
τ¯ + θ
2
α+θ2
pie + θ
α+θ2
(
k¯ − 1) y¯, A = α
α+θ2
τ¯ + θ
2
α+θ2
pie, b = α + θ2
and a = α
α+θ2
, and satisfies the conditions B > A, b > 0 and a > 0. Therefore, Propositions
1 and 3 continue to hold for the model extension. Proposition 3 also holds when the sufficient
condition βθ ≤ √2C is replaced by B − A ≤√2C/b, which reduces to θ√
α+θ2
(
k¯ − 1) y¯ ≤
√
2C.
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